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Abstract 
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Kazakhstan officials made market-oriented 
stabilization reforms to its previously Soviet-planned economy, including removing most 
price constraints, privatizing various state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and taking steps to 
prevent the collapse of its banking system. As part of its efforts, Kazakhstan created the 
Rehabilitation Bank (RB) in 1995 to absorb the large number of non-performing assets from 
state-owned banks while also assuming a corresponding amount of the institutions’ 
liabilities, essentially “shrinking their portfolios” (Implementation Completion Report 
1998). The RB, established with a four-year mandate, either liquidated the debtors or 
required the firms to restructure. Kazakhstan policymakers also created two other 
institutions alongside the RB to take the non-performing assets associated with businesses 
in specialized industries. Overall, loans totaling 11% of the country’s gross domestic product 
were transferred to the RB and the two other asset management companies. The RB’s 
collection methodology and final recovery figures are unclear. The non-performing asset 
transfers did not have an immediate positive impact on the quality of Kazakhstan’s banking 
system portfolio. Though the portion of the country’s loans considered non-performing fell 
to a third in 1995, the figure rose to 41.3% by the end of 1996. The increase was due to better 
loan classification and an underlying deterioration in loan quality. Still, some have credited 
the policy with helping to prevent the banking system’s collapse. 
Keywords: Kazakhstan, asset management companies, asset purchase programs, 
Rehabilitation Bank, non-performing loans, non-performing assets. 
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At a Glance  
Prior to the early 1990s, the Soviet central 
bank, Gosbank, allocated all financial 
resources to its republics. Kazakhstan’s 
financial system was historically organized 
to accommodate this relationship and 
remained structured this way after the 
1991 dissolution of the union. In 1992, the 
country’s banking system was made up of 
former Gosbank domestic arm National 
Bank of Kazakhstan (NBK), which became 
the country’s central bank, five specialized 
state banks, and more than 70 smaller 
commercial banks. Gosbank previously 
directed credit to the specialized banks and 
required them to lend the resources to 
specific firms. This credit “resembled 
budget transfers” because debt payment 
was not enforced (Hoelscher 1998). This 
contributed to an eventual run-up in non-
performing assets.   
After the Soviet Union’s collapse, 
Kazakhstan lost its traditional revenue 
sources, lacked domestic financing from 
nonbank institutions, and had little access 
to international capital markets. The 
country’s economy contracted sharply, 
living standards fell, and the number of 
insolvent businesses grew, including those 
to which the main state banks lent. By 
1994, an audit showed nonperforming debt in Kazakhstan equaled 55 percent of total 
portfolios in the country (Gürgen et al. 1999). 
To prevent a collapse in the banking system, the assets of which were largely concentrated 
in the largest five banks, the newly independent NBK established the asset management 
company (AMC) Rehabilitation Bank3 (RB) to manage firms that constituted the biggest 
 
3 Also called the “Rehabilitation Trust” in various sources. 
Summary of Key Terms 
Purpose: To transfer non-performing assets from the 
country’s biggest debtors to ameliorate the poor 
profitability of state banks, where a majority of the 
country’s deposits were held, to prevent a broader 
banking system collapse (Hoelscher 1998). 
Launch Dates  First transfer to RB: 1995 
Wind-down Dates Unknown 
Program Size Not specified at outset  
Size and Type of NPL 
Problem 
Nonperforming debt equaled 
55% of total portfolios in 
1994 (Gürgen et al. 1999) 
Largely state-directed 
commercial loans 
Eligible Institutions The country’s largest banks 
Open and closed-bank 
Usage At least 11% of GDP 
transferred (Hoelscher 
1998) 
Outcomes No data on recovery efforts 
available 
Ownership Structure Government-owned 
Notable Features Involved the forced 
restructuring or liquidation 
of the debtor firms that had 
their assets transferred to 
the asset management 
company 
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financial burden on the banks. The Ministry of Finance (MOF) also played a substantial role 
in the RB’s establishment and operations (Staff Appraisal Report 1995). 
The RB forced the selected firms to restructure or liquidate and took on the businesses’ non-
performing loans to help clean up their balance sheets, along with the major banks’ (Staff 
Appraisal Report 1995). The central bank considered blanket loan forgiveness but 
eventually rejected the option because it worried banks would come to expect such bailouts 
in the future (Hoelscher 1998). The RB took non-performing loans of 45 of the largest 
insolvent debtors,4 most of which were large metallurgical and mining companies, and a 
corresponding amount of liabilities, shrinking banks’ portfolios (Hoelscher 1998). “The state 
in many ways relieved banks of bad loans that had been imposed by authorities” 
(Implementation Completion Report 1998). 
The NBK established the RB as part of a broader financial system stabilization strategy, 
which included tightening entry requirements for new financial institutions and 
modernizing the country’s legal and regulatory conditions. The NBK also created the 
Agricultural Support Fund (ASF), which took over loans extended to nearly 4,000 insolvent 
farms, and utilized the already-existing Exim Bank to acquire loans that export credit 
agencies funded because of previous government guarantees (Hoelscher 1998).  
The RB and the two other AMCs struggled to resolve the bad loans they absorbed. A detailed 
account of the AMCs’ overarching collection methodology does not appear to be available. 
The government auctioned off some of the bad loans, and later began paying joint stock 
company Agency on Reorganization and Liquidation of Insolvent Enterprises to deal with 
the non-performing debts (Implementation Completion Report 1998). The State Property 
Committee, an entity created to privatize SOEs, also assisted in the sale of a chosen 
company’s assets (Staff Appraisal Report 1995).  
Summary Evaluation 
The Kazakhstani government struggled to adequately resolve the bad loans transferred to 
its three AMCs largely because the institutions were unable to comprehensively restructure 
many of the indebted businesses and farms. By 1998, the RB had provided its restructuring 
and liquidation services for only 14 of the chosen firms, including liquidating five and 
pushing for staff reductions in eight (Implementation Completion Report 1998).  
The failure to adequately restructure some of the firms stems in part from management and 
funding problems that arose. The Kazakhstani cabinet made restructuring decisions for the 
largest selected firms, and the MOF held back most of the funds appropriated for the RB, 
“making it difficult to make agreed payments under restructuring plans” (Republic of 
 
 
4 Various sources give different figures for the total number of enterprises the RB handled. The author chose 
Hoelscher 1998’s 45 figure because of the report’s singular focus on Kazakhstan’s restructuring program and 
the time elapsed between the program’s inception and the report’s publish date. 
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Kazakhstan 2001). World Bank researchers argued that even if the restructuring efforts 
were ineffective, the process still minimized “allocation of further resources to” the 
enterprises, “contributing significantly to the health of the banking sector” (Implementation 
Completion Report 1998). 
Even so, the prioritization of restructuring viable businesses took scarce government 
resources, slowing “the emergence of a prosperous enterprise sector” (Hoelscher 1998). 
“The activities of the AMCs would have been more effective had debtors been quickly closed, 
assets sold off, and the nonperforming loans quickly liquidated” (Hoelscher 1998). 
Analyses conducted in 1998, four years after the asset transfers began, showed mixed 
outcomes. The banking sector’s balance sheet improved, according to a World Bank review 
detailing the completion of its financial support for the asset purchase program 
(Implementation Completion Report 1998). Though the portion of the country’s loans 
considered non-performing fell to a third in 1995, the figure rose to 41.3% by the end of 
1996 (Hoelscher 1998). The rise in bad assets was partly due to improved loan classification 
standards but also an actual deterioration in asset quality (Hoelscher 1998). Still, some have 
argued that the NBK successfully prevented the banking system’s collapse, partially because 
of “avoidance of moral hazard” and the other concurrent restructuring policies (Hoelscher 
1998). 
The program did not involve substantial capital injections, nor operational and institutional 
restructuring of the banks that took on the bad assets to begin with, causing four of the 
country’s biggest banks to undergo further financial stress, which then lead to a subsequent 
bailout and “merge recapitalization” of two of the financial institutions (Tang, Zoli, and 
Klytchnikova 2000). Kazakhstan’s experience “illustrates how bank restructuring without 
adequate capitalization and not accompanied by operational and institutional restructuring 
cannot resolve banking sector problems and may require successive government 
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Kazakhstan’s Rehabilitation Bank: Kazakhstan Context 
GDP 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted to USD) 
$21.25 billion in 1994 
$20.37 billion in 1995 
GDP per capita 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted to USD) 
$1,316 in 1994 
$1,288 in 1995 
Sovereign credit rating (five-year senior debt) NA 
Size of banking system 
 
$3.66 billion in 1994 
$2.17 billion in 1995 
Size of banking system as a percentage of GDP 17.20% in 1994 
10.64% in 1995 
Size of banking system as a percentage of financial 
system 
NA 
Five-bank concentration of banking system 
 
NA 
Foreign involvement in banking system 
NA 
Government ownership of banking system 
 
NA in 1994 
19% in 1995 
Existence of deposit insurance NA 
Sources: Bloomberg; World Bank Global Financial Development Database; World Bank 
Deposit Insurance Dataset; Cull et al. 
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Key Design Decisions 
1. Part of a Package: Kazakhstan used asset management companies to take 
nonperforming loans off banks’ books, canceling the banks’ corresponding liabilities, 
but did not inject government capital to ensure banks’ ability to sustain losses on 
other loans.  
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Kazakhstani government was 
concerned with averting a broad banking system collapse. It focused initially on 
restructuring the large state banks by dealing with the country’s sizeable stock of 
nonperforming loans. It also heightened the entry requirements for new banks and 
increased minimum capital requirements (Hoelscher 1998).  
The NBK, tasked with running the restructuring efforts, used the RB and two specialized 
AMCs to take nonperforming loans off banks’ balance sheets. It removed the banks’ 
corresponding liabilities to the government, essentially shrinking banks’ portfolios 
(Hoelscher 1998). However, the government did not inject government capital to ensure 
banks could sustain losses on other loans. 
The RB took non-performing loans of 45 of the largest insolvent debtors, mostly 
metallurgical and mining companies. The Agricultural Support Fund (ASF) took loans 
extended to nearly 4,000 insolvent farms, and the existing Exim Bank took loans that export 
credit agencies had funded under government guarantees (Hoelscher 1998). 
The RB chose businesses that were the largest burdens on the country’s banks. It forced 
insolvent debtors to liquidate or restructure by cutting them off from any funds outside of 
the RB itself (Staff Appraisal Report 1995). The RB required insolvent debtors to submit 
restructuring plans that the RB board would accept or reject, the latter of which triggered 
liquidation (Staff Appraisal Report 1995). But the AMC “gave priority to enterprise 
rehabilitation rather than liquidation, developing comprehensive downsizing and 
restructuring plans for each enterprise” (Hoelscher 1998). 
2. Legal Authority: A presidential decree outlined the RB’s legal status, structure, 
responsibilities, and authority. 
A subsequent detailed statute would later elaborate management characteristics, according 
to a World Bank report detailing the RB plan before its full implementation (Staff Appraisal 
Report 1995). 
3. Special Powers: Officials passed new regulations and laws to provide the RB the 
necessary powers to liquidate and sell assets. 
The specific nature of the new powers policymakers granted the RB is unclear. 
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4. Mandate: The RB’s mandate included restructuring and liquidating firms whose 
non-performing loans it took off banks’ books. 
The RB prioritized restructuring, potentially because it played a role in overall privatization 
and liberalization efforts, and as such, appeared to have no strictly enforced mandate to 
resolve the bad debt on its books (Hoelscher 1998). 
5. Ownership: The RB was government-owned.  
The NBK established the RB as an entirely state-owned joint stock bank (Staff Appraisal 
Report 1995). Officials chose the central bank because the NBK’s staff was the main source 
of specialized banking and finance knowledge the government could tap (Hoelscher 1998). 
A World Bank report detailing the RB’s structure suggested the RB began business on the 
property of one of the country’s commercial banks, accessing the institution’s 
communication and computer systems as part of a “fee-based contractual arrangement” 
(Staff Appraisal Report 1995). 
6. Governance: A Supervisory Board comprised of various government ministry 
leaders oversaw the RB, while NBK employees and local professionals made up the 
RB’s core staff.  
The RB’s Supervisory Board was chaired by a policymaker of at least “Deputy Prime Minister 
rank” and included members of the economy and finance ministries, the NBK, the State 
Property Committee, and outside “independent” finance and business management experts 
(Staff Appraisal Report 1995). The board’s mandate involved approving restructuring or 
liquidation plans and deciding the amount of financial support a debtor company received 
(Staff Appraisal Report 1995).  
The RB’s Management was headed by a local director with finance experience. Officials 
incentivized management to reduce firms’ budgetary costs, cut losses, and keep businesses 
under the RB’s watch for less than three to four years (Staff Appraisal Report 1995). The 
management incentivization methodology is unknown. 
NBK employees staffed the RB because it was the main source of banking expertise in the 
country (Hoelscher 1998). Other local professionals with experience in finance, law, 
business, social security, and liquidations were to be recruited as well, with the staff 
attending courses led by foreign experts and other trainings (Staff Appraisal Report 1995). 
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7. Size: The government did not set a maximum size for the program at the outset.  
Non-performing loans totaling 11% of Kazakhstan’s GDP were transferred to the RB and the 
other AMCs by 1998. The RB took loans equivalent to one percent of GDP, the ASF received 
assets equaling four percent, and Exim took on loans of about six percent (Hoelscher 1998). 
8. Funding Source: The RB’s initial funding came from the national budget. 
Any operating losses would be funded through the MOF from the state budget and by NBK 
refinancing facilities and RB bonds, which were guaranteed by the government, at market 
interest rates (Staff Appraisal Report 1995). The World Bank also helped finance the RB’s 
operations with a loan to the Kazakhstani government (Staff Appraisal Report 1995). 
9. Eligible Institutions: Kazakhstan’s largest banks were the RB’s target creditors. 
At the time of the program’s establishment, a weak economy and tightening monetary policy 
exacerbated the nonperforming loan problem, initially brought on by state-directed lending 
before Kazakhstan achieved independence. To prevent a banking system collapse, the NBK 
and policymakers focused on removing bad debt that burdened the largest banks, where 
most of the country’s deposits were held (Hoelscher 1998). 
10. Eligible Assets: Loans to the largest nonperforming debtors in the country were 
the target bad assets. 
The businesses were selected chiefly by their total non-performing debt and burdens on 
“creditors in terms of outstanding non-performing net liabilities to banks, enterprises, and 
the state’s budget and extra-budget funds” (Staff Appraisal Report 1995). At the outset, the 
World Bank stated most of the firms likely to meet the criteria would be majority state-
owned (Staff Appraisal Report 1995). The initial plan documents allowed the RB to take on 
40 institutions, but the AMC had restructured or liquidated 45 by 1998 (Staff Appraisal 
Report 1995). Most debtors were large metallurgical and mining companies. 
Public service enterprises, such as utilities, were excluded because liquidation would be 
unrealistic and such firms’ “financial problems stem largely from state pricing policies rather 
than operating inefficiencies” (Staff Appraisal Report 1995).  
11. Acquisition (Mechanics): The RB removed the nonperforming loans by also 
taking on a corresponding amount of a bank’s liabilities. 
This shrunk the financial institutions’ portfolios (Hoelscher 1998).  
12. Acquisition (Pricing): It is unclear how RB officials priced the assets the AMC 
received. 
Available program documents do not contain information about the RB’s pricing 
methodology. 
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13. Asset Management and Disposal: The RB required chosen firms to submit 
restructuring plans that the RB board would accept or reject, the latter of which 
triggered liquidation. The RB’s nonperforming loan disposal methodology is unclear. 
The AMC “gave priority to enterprise rehabilitation rather than liquidation, developing 
comprehensive downsizing and restructuring plans for each enterprise” (Hoelscher 1998). 
Privatization was generally expected as part of restructuring plans as well, if applicable. 
Support from the RB remained “strictly tied to the implementation of the time-phased 
restructuring plans” (Staff Appraisal Report 1995). If the plans were not implemented 
completely or if they failed to make the chosen firm financially viable, the business would be 
liquidated and its assets sold. In a similarly strict ethos, the possibility that a firm’s 
management could be replaced in the event of even “minor shortfalls” in the restructuring 
process was an “enforcement tool” available to Kazakhstani officials (Staff Appraisal Report 
1995). 
Most documents detailing the RB’s establishment include little to no information about the 
AMC’s nonperforming loan disposal methodology, though the government appeared to 
auction off some of the bad loans. Authors of a report published three years after the RB’s 
establishment stated the resolution of bad loans on the AMCs’ balance sheets were of 
concern to the Kazakhstani government. Rehabilitation “institutions that received the non-
performing loans were not able to make much headway in restructuring indebted farms and 
enterprises” (Implementation Completion Report 1998).  
The failure to adequately restructure some of the firms stems in part from management and 
funding problems that arose. The Kazakhstani cabinet made restructuring decisions for the 
largest selected firms, and the MOF held back most of the funds appropriated for the RB, 
“making it difficult to make agreed payments under restructuring plans” (Republic of 
Kazakhstan 2001). 
14. Timeframe: The RB’s initial mandate was four years. 
The government originally planned to close the RB, “a temporary institution,” after four 
years (Staff Appraisal Report 1995). In June 1998, the RB was reorganized and renamed the 
“Rehabilitation Fund.”5 With available documents, details are unknown regarding this new 
organization’s structure, purpose, and funding, and if and when its operations ceased. 
References and Key Program Documents 
Implementation Documents 
(Implementation Completion Report 1998)  “Implementation Completion Report: 
Kazakhstan Financial Sector Adjustment Loan.” 1998. 18013, June 18, 1998. The World 
 
5 Many thanks to the Agency for Regulation and Development of the Financial Market of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan authorities for their help tracking down RB facts. 
298
Kazakhstan’s Rehabilitation Bank Nunn
 
Bank. 
World Bank report summarizing the results of part of Kazakhstan’s financial system 
restructuring efforts the institution helped fund. 
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/implementation-completion-report-kazakhstan-
financial-sector-adjustment-loan. 
(Staff Appraisal Report 1995)  “Staff Appraisal Report: Republic of Kazakhstan 
Financial and Enterprises Development Project.” 1995. 13553-KZ, March 29, 1995. The 
World Bank. 
World Bank report outlining the terms of a loan to support Kazakhstan’s economic and 
financial system restructuring efforts. 
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/staff-appraisal-report-republic-kazakhstan-financial-
and-enterprises-development-project. 
Key Academic Papers 
(Akimov and Dollery 2008)  Akimov, Alexander, and Brian Dollery. 2008. “Financial System 
Reform in Kazakhstan from 1993 to 2006 and Its Socioeconomic Effects.” Emerging 
Markets Finance & Trade 44 (3): 81–97. 
Research paper analyzing Kazakhstan’s experience with financial-sector liberalization and 




(Gürgen, Snoek, Craig, McHugh, Izvorski, and van Rooden 1999)  Gürgen, Emine, 
Harry Snoek, John Craig, Jimmy McHugh, Ivailo Izvorski, and Ron van Rooden. 1999. 
“Economic Reforms in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and 
Uzbekistan.” Occasional Papers, August 1999. Washington DC: International Monetary 
Fund. 
IMF report detailing economic reforms former Soviet Union republics implemented since 
gaining independence in the early 1990s. 
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/economic-reforms-kazakhstan-kyrgyz-
republictajikistan-turkmenistan-and-uzbekistan. 
(Hoelscher 1998)  Hoelscher, David. 1998. “Banking System Restructuring in 
Kazakhstan.” SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 882612, June 1, 1998. International Monetary Fund. 
IMF working paper detailing Kazakhstan’s financial restructuring efforts in the 1990s, 
including the creation of the asset management company Rehabilitation Bank, which received 
non-performing loans from state-owned banks. 
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/banking-system-restructuring-kazakhstan. 
(“Republic of Kazakhstan” 2001)  “Republic of Kazakhstan Country Assistance 
Evaluation.” 2001. 21862, February 20, 2001. Washington DC: The World Bank. 
World Bank report evaluating its previous support for Kazakhstani reforms. 
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/republic-kazakhstan-country-assistance-evaluation. 
(Tang, Zoli, and Klytchnikova 2000)  Tang, Helena, Edda Zoli, and Irina Klytchnikova. 
2000. “Banking Crises in Transition Economies: Fiscal Costs and Related Issues.” 2484, 
January 11, 2000. The World Bank. 




The Journal of Financial Crises Vol. 3 Iss. 2
 
 
Copyright 2021 © Yale University. All rights reserved. To order copies of this material or to 
receive permission to reprint any or all of this document, please contact the Yale Program 
for Financial Stability at ypfs@yale.edu.  
300
Kazakhstan’s Rehabilitation Bank Nunn
